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RULE 4(j) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE FORTHWITH SERVICE REQUIREMENT
OF THE SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT
INTRODUCTION

With the advent of World War I, the United States became actively
involved in the merchant shipping business. In response, Congress created the United States Shipping Board in 1916.' Because it felt that the
government's liability in this field should equal ihat of private participants, Congress provided that vessels purchased, chartered or leased
from the Board, while employed solely as merchant vessels, would be
subject to all laws, regulations and liabilities governing merchant vessels.2 This generous, though limited, waiver of the federal government's
sovereign immunity soon proved troublesome, however. Private litigants
3
began to use in rem actions to arrest government merchant vessels.
In response,4 Congress passed the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), 5
which explicitly exempted from arrest or seizure by judicial process vessels or cargo belonging to the government.6 Instead, Congress specifically provided that in personam actions could be brought against the
United States. 7 Thus, Congress solved the irksome problem of seizure
without retracting its waiver of sovereign immunity.
The SAA provides that an action shall be commenced by filing the
complaint in district9 court.' Congress addressed service of process in
section 2 of the Act:
The libelant shall forthwith serve a copy of his libel on the United
States Attorney for [the proper] district and mail a copy thereof by
registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States, and shall
fie a sworn return of such service and mailing. Such service and mail1. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 801-842 (1982)).
2. See Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 9, 39 Stat. 728, 730-31.
3. See Canadian Aviator Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 219 (1945); The Lake
Monroe, 250 U.S. 246, 253 (1919); 3A M. Norris, Benedict on Admiralty § 197, at 15-2
(1983).
4. See Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 219 (1945); Nahmeh

v. United States, 267 U.S. 122, 124 (1925); Blamberg Bros. v. United States, 260 U.S. 452,

458 (1923).
5. Ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1982)).
6. See Ch. 95, § 1, 41 Stat. 525 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 741
(1982)).
7. See Ch. 95, § 2, 41 Stat. 525, 525-26 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
§ 742 (1982)).

8. See United Nations Relief & Rehab. Admin. v. The Mormacmail, 99 F. Supp.
552, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ("The institution of a suit in admiralty is marked by the filing
of the libel."); 3A M. Norris, supra note 3, § 198, at 15-5 (suit under the SAA is commenced by filing a complaint in a district court).
9. Ch. 95, § 2, 41 Stat. 525, 525-26 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 742
(1982)).
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ing shall constitute valid service on the United States .... 10
In matters of procedure, "forthwith" has been held to allow as little as
twenty-four hours to take a required action."

The legislative history to the SAA does not state a purpose for the
forthwith requirement. 2 Judge Boochever, in his concurring opinion in

Kenyon v. United States, 3 wrote that the forthwith provision was enacted because of the absence, at the time, of a uniform federal procedure

governing service.

4

Although the Act has been amended four times

since 1920,1 Congress has not deleted the forthwith language.

As a consequence of Congress' inaction, the Second and Ninth Circuits have consistently held that failure to satisfy the forthwith require-

ment under the SAA is a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.1 6 The
Third Circuit has held that the forthwith requirement of the SAA is not

jurisdictional but rather procedural in nature. ' 7 That court reasoned

that since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to actions under
the SAA, 8 Rules 4(d)(4) 19 and 4(j) 20 were the proper measures of effec10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. See Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U.S. 181, 193 (1900) ("In matters of
practice and pleading [forthwith] is usually construed, and sometimes defined by rule of
court, as within twenty-four hours"). The Second Circuit in City of New York v. McAllister Bros., 278 F.2d 708 (1960), cited the Dickerman definition of forthwith in dismissing an action under the SAA for failing to meet the forthwith requirement. Id. at
710.
12. See S. Rep. No. 223, 66th Cong. 1st Sess. 1-6.
13. 676 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1981).
14. Id. at 1231 (Boochever, J., concurring).
15. See Act of Aug. 6, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-31, § 12(25), 95 Stat. 151, 155 (codified
as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 743, 747, 749-752 (1982)); Act of Aug. 29, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-417, § 3, 86 Stat. 654, 656 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 749 (1982)); Act of
Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-770, § 3, 74 Stat. 912 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
§ 742 (1982)); Act of December 13, 1950, ch. 1136, 64 Stat. 1112 (codified as amended at
46 U.S.C. § 745 (1982)).
16. See Amelia v. United States, 732 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1984); Kenyon v. United
States, 676 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Battaglia v. United States, 303
F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907 (1962); City of N.Y. v. McAllister
Bros., 278 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1960).
17. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 66 (3d
Cir. 1985); see also Kenyon v. United States, 676 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Boochever, J., concurring); Battaglia v. United States, 303 F.2d 683, 686-87 (2d Cir.
1962) (Friendly, J., concurring).
18. Actions brought under the SAA are based in admiralty. In 1966, the Supreme
Court unified admiralty procedure with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).
See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383
U.S. 1029, 1031-32 (1966).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) governs service of process on the United States. In relevant part it states that "[t]he plaintiff shall . . . [deliver] a copy of the summons and of
the complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States
...
" Id. A proposed change to Rule 4(d)(4) is being considered by the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. The change would
allow a plaintiff to serve the United States Attorney or his designate by registered or
certified mail in lieu of in-hand service as the present rule requires.
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4Q) was added to the FRCP in 1983. Under the Rule "[i]f a
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tive service on the United States and the forthwith requirement had been
superseded.2 1
Whether the SAA service provision is considered jurisdictional or procedural raises important issues about the interaction of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure with federal statutes. In the context of the SAA and
the forthwith requirement, this Note will propose an analysis to be used
when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rule) and a federal
statute collide. Part I considers whether the forthwith requirement of
the SAA is an integral part of the waiver of immunity or whether it is
merely a procedural device, and concludes that it is procedural. Part II
shows that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure supersedes inconsistent federal procedural statutes by applying Hanna v. Plumer. This Note concludes that a valid FRCP preempts an inconsistent federal statute that
regulates only procedure. Accordingly, Rules 4(d)(4) and 4(j) supersede
the forthwith service provision of the SAA.
I.

FORTH

ITH: JURISDICTIONAL CONDITION PRECEDENT OR
PROCEDURAL DEVICE?

Following the position that waivers of immunity must be construed
strictly,' some courts have held the forthwith provision of the SAA to
be part of the substantive waiver of immunity.3 No evidence is cited to
support this position. It is based solely on the obsolete policy of limiting
waivers of sovereign immunity. Although this analysis has been criticized,2 4 courts seem to adopt it because of the ease of its mechanical
service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days
after the filing of the complaint ... the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant
without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion." Id.
21. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 66 (3d
Cir. 1985).
22. See Dieckmann v. United States, 550 F.2d 622, 624 (10th Cir. 1977); Commonwealth ex reL Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172, 1176 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub
nom. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412, 414 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); Sprouse v. Federal Prison Indus., 480 F.2d 1, 34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095 (1973).
Although support for construing waivers strictly might seem persuasive, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that courts should not interpret waivers so strictly as to bar
actions when Congress has seen fit to allow suit against the government. See Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955). See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
23. See, eg., Amelia v. United States, 732 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1984); Kenyon v.
United States, 676 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Barrie v. United States,
615 F.2d 829, 830 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); City of N.Y. v. McAllister Bros., 278
F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1960).
24. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 65-66
(3d Cir. 1985); Battaglia v. United States, 303 F.2d 683, 686-87 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907 (1962); see also Kenyon v. United States, 676
F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1981) (Boochever, J., concurring) ("[I]f freed from the bounds
of stare decisis, I would hold that the service provision of Section 742 does not constitute
an integral part of the substantive waiver of sovereign immunity, but is a mere procedural
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approach.25 However, interpreting the forthwith requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite 26 is an unnecessarily strict reading of the SAA that
defeats the congressional intent to waive the federal government's immunity to admiralty suits.2 7
Although at one time judicial protection of sovereign immunity was
carried out with the blessing of Congress, this is no longer true. 28 Courts
now recognize that when Congress has seen fit to open the United States
to liability the judiciary should not apply an unnecessarily strict reading
of the statute. 29 Instead, congressional intent should be the prime consideration in interpreting a waiver of immunity.30 Since 1940, Congress
provision necessary at the time of the statute's enactment, to effectuate that waiver. As
such it was superseded by the Federal Rules.").
25. In holding that the forthwith requirement is part of the substantive waiver of
immunity, courts have been able to dismiss, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, actions
in which the plaintiff has failed to serve forthwith. This defense of sovereign immunity
can be raised at any time in the proceedings and cannot be waived. See Battaglia v.
United States, 303 F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir.) (United States Attorney has no power to waive
conditions or limitations imposed by SAA), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907 (1962); City of
N.Y. v. McAllister Bros., 177 F. Supp. 679, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (libel dismissed even
though government was not prejudiced by delay in service), aff'd, 278 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.
1960).
26. See Amella v. United States, 732 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1984); Kenyon v. United
States, 676 F.2d 1229, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Battaglia v. United States,
303 F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907 (1962); City of N.Y. v. McAllister Bros., 278 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1960).
27. See Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525-26 (9th Cir.) (the SAA in its
amended form was intended by Congress to cover all maritime torts committed by the
United States), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); see also DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v.
United States, 451 F.2d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 1971) (court rejects restrictive reading of

SAA).
28. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 n.8 (1951) (tracing decline
of sovereign immunity in United States); De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States,
451 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The tide of history is running clearly against the
concept of sovereign immunity. The disfavor into which the doctrine has fallen was observed as far back as. . .1939. . . . Any doubts as to [the government's] waiver therefore are to be resolved against the sovereign.") (citation omitted).
29. In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), the Court stated:
"when dealing with a statute subjecting the Government to liability for potentially great
sums of money, this Court must not promote profligacy by careless construction. Neither
should it as a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a
statute designed to limit it." Id. at 69. Although waivers are construed narrowly, courts
have held that a strict reading should not violate Congress' intent to waive the government's immunity under the SAA. See Cohen v. United States, 195 F.2d 1019, 1021 (2d
Cir. 1952) ("the overriding consideration is that the intent of Congress [in passing the
SAA], where that can be determined, must be given effect"); see also Weiss v. United
States, 168 F. Supp. 300, 301 (D.N.J. 1958) (doctrine of strict construction "does not
mean that there must be a niggling and obnubilative adherence to the narrowest meaning
of the words of the Act" when the intent is to waive immunity.).
30. Roelofs v. United States, 501 F.2d 87, 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (FTCA is to be "given a
broad interpretation to effectuate the legislative aim of putting citizen and national sovereign in tort claim suits on a footing of equality. . . ."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975);
Cohen v. United States, 195 F.2d 1019, 1021 (2d Cir. 1952) (since the intent of amendment to SAA was to give a remedy against the government, the statute should be given
that effect).
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has frequently broadened the scope of governmental tort liability to private litigants.3 Congress has thus demonstrated its desire to hold the
United States accountable for most torts committed by the government.3a
The SAA's purpose was to make governmental liability in merchant
shipping coextensive with that of private litigants.3 3 Imposing the forthwith requirement on those bringing suit under the SAA would impose an
often fatal hurdle not otherwise faced by those suing in admiralty.3 As
such, it frustrates Congress' intent that governmental liability equal that
of private parties under the Act.
In 1960, Congress amended the SAA 35 for two reasons. Confusion by
36
litigants over which statute-the SAA, the Public Vessels Act (PVA),
or the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 37-- to use against the United
States had led to numerous dismissals.38 Congress amended the acts to
allow transfer of cases brought under the wrong statute.39 Congress also
31. The SAA has been amended four times since 1940. See supra note 60. Congress'
major waiver of federal immunity was contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982)).
The FTCA waived the government's immunity to most tort actions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 26712680 (1982).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); see also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61, 68 (1955) ("The broad and just purpose which the [FTCA] was designed to effect
was to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in
circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable .... ).
33. See Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 228 (1945) (Court
applied standard of governmental liability of SAA to PVA); De Bardeleben Marine Corp.
v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. The Australia Star,
172 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 823 (1949).
34. Ordinarily, private litigants in suing federal courts on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction must serve the process within 120 days after filing the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(j). Under the forthwith requirement of the SAA, if a litigant fails to serve forthwith,
the action can be dismissed without prejudice. See Amelia v. United States, 732 F.2d
711, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1984). The danger is that a litigant may not realize he has failed to
meet the service provision until faced with dismissal. Often, the statute of limitations has
run in the meantime, and the dismissal thus becomes final. Private litigants are more apt
to know of Rule 4(j) and comply with it. See eg., Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon
River Towing, Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 63-64 (3d Cir. 1985).
35. See Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-770, § 3, 74 Stat. 912 (codified at 46
U.S.C. § 742 (1982)).
36. Act of March 3, 1925, ch. 428, 43 Stat. 1112-13 (current version at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 781-790 (1982)). The Public Vessels Act allows in personam actions to be brought
against the United States.
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982).
38. See S. Rep. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprintedin 1960 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 3583, 3584-86 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; see also De Bardeleben
Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1971). The De Bardeleben
court, noting the confusion surrounding the interaction of the differing waivers, stated:
Like the land-locked lawyer of yesteryear who found his cause lost for failing to
distinguish trover and replevin, the most skilled admiralty proctor often did not
know when he opened the courthouse door whether the lady or the tiger would
emerge, or whether indeed, the courtroom was open at all.
Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
39. See Senate Report, supra note 38, at 2, reprintedin 1960 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3583, 3583.
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broadened the SAA to encompass all admiralty actions brought against
the United States. 40 Both changes demonstrate Congress' intent that the
SAA effectively waive sovereign immunity. The waiver should not be
defeated in the name of procedure. 4 '
Congress waived federal sovereign immunity to certain tort actions by
passing the Federal Tort Claims Act. 42 The Act specifically excludes
from coverage any tort actions allowed under the SAA or PVA.4 3 Thus,
44
jurisdiction under the FTCA, SAA and the PVA is mutually exclusive.
When Congress broadened the SAA in 1960 to include all admiralty actions brought against the United States,45 the SAA and PVA covered all
applicable admiralty actions and the FTCA most other allowable nonadmiralty tort claims. 4 6 Congress showed no desire to distinguish between the SAA and the FrCA, granting seafaring citizens less access to
judicial relief than land-locked parties.
Since Congress intended the SAA, PVA and the FTCA together to
cover the spectrum of tort actions brought against the government, 47 the
statutes should be interpreted in pan materia.4 a The purpose of the
40. See Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.) (1960 amendment to
the SAA viewed as "legislative attempt to bring all maritime torts asserted against the
United States within the purview of the [SAA]"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (M.D. Tenn.
1977) (Congress intended by the addition of phrase "or if a private person or property
were involved" to extend SAA's waiver of immunity "to all suits sounding in admiralty,
not just those involving vessels or cargo") (emphasis in original).
41. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 4-5, reprinted in 1960 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3583, 3585 ("[T]he decisive question in a lawsuit should, as far as possible, be its
merits and not esoteric, technical problems of procedure.").
42. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951); see Act of Aug. 2,
1946, ch. 753, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 26712680 (1982)).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1982).
44. Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d
Cir. 1985); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1070 (1974).
45. See supra note 40.
46. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951) ("[FTCA] waives
the Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language") (footnote omitted).
47. The SAA and the PVA together govern all admiralty actions brought against the
government. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. The FTCA is the major
waiver of governmental sovereign immunity. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U.S. 543, 547, 550 (1951). See generally Gottlieb, The Federal Tort ClaimsAct-A Stottory Interpretation,35 Geo. L.J. 1 (1946) (a general overview of the workings and purpose
of FTCA). Since jurisdiction under these three acts is mutually exclusive, see supra note
225 and accompanying text, Congress has intended the acts together to cover most tort
actions brought against the government.
48. In Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), the Supreme Court, quoting Brown
v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1857), explained that courts must interpret
statutes on similar subjects with reference to each other. Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 650. The
District of Columbia Circuit, in Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081
(D.C. Cir. 1980), held that since the FTCA and SAA both contained similar language,
they should be construed in pari materia. Id. at 1089. Construing the SAA and the
FrCA in pari materia will lead courts to recognize that since Congress has intended these
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FTCA was to relieve Congress from the pressure of the use of private
bills to settle claims against the government.4 9 Thus, courts interpreting
the FTCA take care not to "whittle down" the scope of the Act by refinement. o Reducing the number of private bills before Congress was a pri-

mary consideration in passing the SAA as well. 5' In construing the
FTCA, courts have given full effect to the government's relinquishment

of its historic immunity from suit.52 Likewise, because Congress had

similar "humanitarian objectives" in passing the SAA,5 3 it should be

given the same broad interpretation as that given the FTCA.
The Tucker Act,

4

the contract law predecessor of the FTCA, was a

partial waiver of sovereign immunity. 5 In 1938, the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, superseding all inconsistent

federal procedural law.56 At that time the Tucker Act contained service
provisions differing from those under the new Rules.5 7 The service provisions were among those modified by the FRCP58 because they were considered procedural, not jurisdictional.59 If the service provisions of the
Tucker Act were considered procedural and therefore properly superseded by the Federal Rules, the service provisions of the SAA, also a
waiver of immunity, should be superseded.
In 1966, the Supreme Court's Admiralty Rules, which had been in
waivers to be interpreted liberally, courts should not regard the forthwith provision of the
SAA as a jurisdictional precedent but rather a procedural device.
49. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963) (FTCA's purpose was not only
to allow claims against government but also to eliminate burden on Congress of passing
private bills for those seeking compensation); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955) (same).
50. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951).
51. See Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 219 (1945) (burden of
passing private bills led to Shipping Act of 1916); 3A M. Norris, supra note 3, § 197, at
15-2 n.4 (burden of private bills was a factor influencing passage of SAA).
52. Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1954); see Indian Towing Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955) (FTCA's purpose was to compensate victims of
governmental negligence); Roelofs v. United States, 501 F.2d 87, 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (egislative aim of FTCA was to put private parties and the government on "a footing of
equality"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
53. Malgren v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D. Mich. 1975); see Beeler v.
United States, 256 F. Supp. 771, 776 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (SAA and FTCA require virtually
equal duty of the United States).
54. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1982) and
other scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
55. International Eng'g Co. v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 573, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Congress, through passage of the Tucker Act, has consented to be sued in certain contract
actions), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
57. Former sections 28 U.S.C. §§ 762 and 763 of the Tucker Act had previously controlled service against the government. See United States v. American Sur. Co., 25 F.
Supp. 700, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
58. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 1937 advisory committee note.
59. United States v. American Sur. Co., 25 F. Supp. 700, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) ("It is
to be presumed that the Supreme Court considered the problem of whether or not Sections 762 and 763 of 28 U.S.C.A. were procedUral or substantive and concluded that the
procedure outlined therein could be altered by the new rules.").
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existence since 1845, were unified with the FRCP and the traditional

maritime remedies were reenacted as the Supplemental Rules (A-E).6°
Because the FRCP did not govern procedures in admiralty suits before
1966, no conflict existed between the Federal Rules and the forthwith

service provision of the SAA. The precedents relied on to support the
position that the forthwith requirement is jurisdictional were decided
prior to the application of the FRCP to the SAA. 6 '
The forthwith service requirement of the SAA should not be considered a jurisdictional time bar as section 5 of the SAA 6 2 already contains a
separate and independent two-year statute of limitations. 63 This limitation is jurisdictional and when raised as a defense deprives a court of the
power to entertain the action." Filing the complaint with the district

court is the only method of satisfying the limitations period.65 Since the
service provision of the Act does not affect the limitations period, it

should not be construed as jurisdictional.
The clear logic that recognizes the distinction between the jurisdictional and the procedural provisions of the Act should be accepted. Congressional intent requires that the SAA be given full effect, and not be
limited by overly restrictive interpretations. The forthwith requirement
is procedural. However, as a procedural rule it conflicts with FRCP
4(d)(4) and 4(j), and must be reconciled or superseded.

II.

RECONCILING FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
FEDERAL STATUTES

Since the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Supreme Court has often been called on to interpret the proper place the
60. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 383 U.S. 1029 (1966).
61. See Battaglia v. United States, 303 F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 371
U.S. 907 (1962); City of N.Y. v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 278 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1960).
These cases are the precedents most relied on by the courts holding that forthwith service
is a jurisdictional requirement. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing,
Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1985).
62. Ch. 1136, 64 Stat. 1112, 1112 (1950) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1982)).
63. "Suits as authorized by this chapter may be brought only within two years after
the cause of action arises . . . ." Id.
64. States Marine Corp. v. United States, 283 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1960) (two-year
time bar of the SAA is different from ordinary statute of limitation in that a court has no
jurisdiction to hear a case brought after limitation has expired); Osbourne v. United
States, 164 F.2d 767, 768 (2d Cir. 1947) (same). The reason for the difference is that the
SAA is a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit
against the United States is defined by the terms of the waiver of immunity). The twoyear statute of limitations is a substantive part of the SAA and is therefore jurisdictional.
See Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 526-27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974).
65. Battaglia v. United States, 303 F.2d 683, 685 (2d Cir. 1962) (quoting United Nations Relief & Rehab. Admin. v. The Mormacmail, 99 F. Supp. 552, 554 (S.D.N.Y.
1951)); cf Bates Mfg. Co. v. United States, 303 U.S. 567, 572 (1938) (holding similarly
under Tucker Act).
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Rules should take among federal 66 and state statutes.6' The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Rules Enabling Act68 as an "authorization of a
comprehensive system of court rules.", 69 The Court stated that Congress
intended "that the whole field of court procedure be regulated in the
interest of speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth."7 0
Most disputes concerning the FRCP stem from the seemingly inconsistent commands of the Enabling Act. Although the Act declares that
the "rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant,"71 it also states that ". . . all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect."7 2 The question is what effect
does a FRCP have on a seemingly inconsistent federal procedural
statute.
Rule 4(j) of the FRCP directs that if a summons and complaint is not
served on the defendant within 120 days of filing the complaint, the action will be dismissed.7 3 Thus, Rule 4(j) seems to conflict with the
"forthwith" provision of the SAA. The effect of a Federal Rule on an
inconsistent federal procedural statute, such as the forthwith provision of

the SAA, is an issue of legislative intent.
A. Rules EnablingAct
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the culmination of a reform movement to pass a uniform federal procedure bill,7 4 was partially drafted
more than twenty years prior to its passage." The Enabling Act was
66. See Synder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Rule 23 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982));
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (Rule 35 as applied to a defendant and
Rules Enabling Act); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946)
(Rule 4(f) and Rules Enabling Act); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry
Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956) (Rule 54(b) and Rules Enabling Act); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1 (1941) (Rule 35 as applied to plaintiff and Rules Enabling Act).
67. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (Rule 3 and Okla. Stat. tit.
12, § 97 (1971)); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (Rule 4(d)(1) and Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann., ch. 197, § 9 (1958)); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530 (1949) (Rule 3 and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-308 (1935)); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (Rule 23(b) and 1945 N.J. Laws ch. 131)).
68. Ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
69. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); see Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946).
70. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); cf Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (Court recognized that rights of litigants would be
affected by the Federal Rules).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
72. Id.

73. See Coleman v. Greyhound Lines, 100 F.R.D. 476, 477 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (dismissal
will be without_prejudice and a new action can be instituted unless the statute of limitations has run); Sanders v. Marshall, 100 F.R.D. 480, 482-83 (V.D. Pa. 1984) (same).
74. For an exhaustive study of the legislative history of the Rules, see Burbank, The
Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 (1982).

75. See Burbank, supra note 74, at 1054 & n.166.
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based on the Clayton Bill, 7 6 first introduced in the House of Representatives in 1912." The Clayton Bill was based on Congress' grant of authority to the Supreme Court to promulgate Equity Rules 78 under
section 917 of the Revised Statutes. 9 Section 917 had specific language
making the rules promulgated under them inferior to existing federal
statutes.80 The Clayton Bill was initially silent as to the power of the
proposed rules.81
In 1914, a House committee recommended the Clayton Bill's passage
with an amendment.8 2 In its report, the committee concluded that an
express statutory repeal of inconsistent existing statutes was not only desirable but necessary. 3 Only by giving the Enabling Act superseding
effect could the goal of instituting uniform federal procedure be
achieved.84 The Clayton Bill was therefore amended to provide that any
law that conflicted with a rule promulgated under the Act would be superseded.85 This provision remained unchanged in the following years
and was enacted in its entirety in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.86
In amending the Clayton Bill to give it superseding effect, the committee sought to make it clear that any superseding effect of the rules would
be derived from the authorizing statute, not the rules themselves.8 7 The
general language of superseding effect contained in the bill was adopted
because it would be impractical to list all procedural statutes superseded
by the rules.88 From this brief review of congressional history of the
Rules Enabling Act, it is clear that Congress intended a valid Federal
76. See H.R. 26,462, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1912), reprinted in 38 A.B.A. Rep. 542
(1913).
77. See id. reprintedin 38 A.B.A. Rep. 542 (1913); Burbank, supra note 74, at 1050
n.154.
78. See Burbank, supra note 74, at 1052-53 n.161.
79. Ch. 18, tit. XIII, (Rev. Stat. § 917 (1878)).
80. Ch. 18, tit. XIII, (Rev. Stat. § 917 (1878)) ("[t]he Supreme Court shall have
power to prescibe, from time to time, and in any manner not inconsistent with any law of
the United States, the forms of writs and other process ... and generally to regulate the
whole practice, to be used, in suits in equity or admiralty by the circuit and district
courts") (emphasis added).
81. See H.R. 26,462, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1912), reprinted in 38 A.B.A. Rep. 542
(1913).
82. See H.R. Rep. No. 462, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) [hereinafter cited as 1914
House Report].
83. See id. at 16.
84. If the new rules did not have superseding effect, contrary state and federal procedures would continue to be employed in the federal courts. See Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963).
85. See 1914 House Report, supra note 82, at 1 (The Committee amended the Clayton Bill to read: "When and as the rules of the court herein authorized shall be promulgated, all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force and effect".).
86. See ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982));
Burbank, supra note 74, at 1054 n. 166.
87. See Hearings on ABA Bills Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 22 (1914).
88. See 1914 House Report, supra note 82, at 16; Burbank, supra note 74, at 1052-53
& n.161.
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Rule to supersede an inconsistent federal statutory provision. Although
this basic idea is a foundation of the FRCP, it is still misunderstood by

some courts.8 9 The legislative history of the Rules Enabling Act demonstrates that a valid Federal Rule preempts conflicting federal procedural
statutes. Because the forthwith requirement of the SAA is procedural,
the next inquiry becomes whether Rule 4(j) is a valid Federal Rule and
whether it conflicts with the forthwith provision.
B. Applying Hanna v. Plumer
In Hanna v. Plumer,90 the Supreme Court created a test for issues concerning the scope of the Federal Rules and the Enabling Act. The
Hanna analysis is a two-step test. First, the conflicting rules must be
examined. If they have the same purpose, then one must be given preference over the other.9" The second inquiry is whether the Federal Rule is
within the Supreme Court's authority under the Rules Enabling Act. If
so then it is a valid Rule that supersedes the conflicting rule.9" The
Hanna analysis is relevant to the dispute at hand because it provides a
method for reconciling a Federal Rule with an inconsistent statute.

Under the first prong the "forthwith" requirement of the SAA and
Rule 4)

93

directly collide, because by allowing 120 days for service

89. The Ninth Circuit in Amella v. United States, 732 F.2d 711 (1984), thought it a
"dubious assumption that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can amend an act of
Congress ...

."

Id. at 713.

90. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna, Rule 4(d)(1) conflicted with a Massachusetts
statute requiring "in hand" service. Although this Note deals with a conflict between a
federal statute and a Federal Rule, Hannais applicable because it is the Supreme Court's
most thorough analysis of the proper effect of Federal Rules.
91. See id. at 470; see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980).
The Walker Court in explaining Hanna stated: "The first question must therefore be
whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue
before the Court." Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50. Simplified, a "direct collision" must exist
between the competing statutes. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. For example, in Hanna the
Court held that the clash between the Federal Rule and the state statute was unavoidable.
See id. at 470. In Walker the Court followed Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 and a state statute holding that
service tolls a state statute of limitations do not collide because they do not share the
same purpose. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51. The Court stated that Fed. R. Civ. P. 3
was not intended to toll a state statute of limitations. See id at 750.
92. In Hanna, the Court held that
when a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules [if a Federal Rule and
competing statute share the same purpose] the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee,
this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional
restrictions.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941) ("we
have a rule which, if within the power delegated to this court, has the force of a federal
statute").
93. The 1982 amendments to the Rules were contained in an act of Congress. See
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, §§ 2-6,
96 Stat. 2527. Although the issue has not been decided by the courts, one commentator
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before dismissal, 4(j) treats as timely, service that would be untimely
under a forthwith sevice requirement. Prior to 1982, the burden of serv-

ing the defendant was put on the federal marshals.94 Thus, the issue of
timely service often did not arise. Instead, there was a heavy presumption
of validity of service by the marshals. 95 In 1983, Rule 4 was amended to
include a 120-day time limit for service of process (Rule 4(j))96 to prevent
undue delay by litigants. 97 Since Rule 4(j) and the forthwith provision
both are designed to set a time limit for service, they do in fact collide.98

Under the second Hanna inquiry, Rule 4(j) will not apply only if it

exceeds the authority of the Enabling Act99 or is unconstitutional.I°° As
discussed earlier, rules properly promulgated under the Rules Enabling

suggests that these new Rules have the effect on prior law of a subsequent federal statute.
See Walker, The 1983 Amendments to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 4-Process,Jurisdiction, and Erie PrinciplesRevisited, 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. 957, 977 (1983). If they
possessed such force there would be no need to determine if they were within the bounds
of the Enabling Act. As an equal federal statute, these Rules would only have to survive
constitutional challenge. See id. at 977. Rule 40) would then clearly preempt the forthwith provision of the SAA. Although such an analysis is logical, it seems unlikely that
courts would employ it. The legislative history of the 1982 Amendments contains no
evidence to suggest that Congress intended these new Rules to have an effect different
from prior Rules. See Changes in FederalSummons Service Under Amended Rule 4 of
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,96 F.R.D. 81 (1983) for a comprehensive account of
the legislative history. In addition, even though the 1982 Amendments were contained in
an act of Congress, they were passed under the framework laid out in the Rules Enabling
Act. On April 28, 1982, the Supreme Court sent Congress several proposed amendments
that would have taken effect on August 1, 1982 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). See
Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,93 F.R.D. 255 (1982). Objections
by Congress led to a postponement of the effective date to Oct. 1, 1983. See Act of Aug.
2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246. Congress then passed its own rules. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat.
2527 (1982). Section 5 of that act provides that the Supreme Court's promulgation "shall
not take effect". See id. at 2530. Rule 40) should therefore be treated as any other federal rule promulgated by the Supreme Court and not as a federal statute.
94. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c) (1982) (superseded by 1982 amendments); Siegal, Practice
Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4, 96 F.R.D. 88, 94 (1983).
95. See Siegal, supra note 94, 96 F.R.D. at 109.
96. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462,
§ 2, 96 Stat. 2527, 2528. Rule 40) reads:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within
120 days after the filing of the complaint. . . the action shall be dismissed as to
that defendant without prejudice. .

.

. Fed. R. Civ. P. 40).

97. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 40) advisory committee note ("As long as service was performed by marshals such a restriction was not necessary. However, the proposed gradual
elimination of marshal service raises new concerns about timeliness.").
98. In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980), the Court made it
clear that in determining if rules are in conflict, the Federal Rules should be given their
"plain meaning". Since the purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) and 40) are together to
provide a uniform procedure for serving process against the United States, giving these
rules their "plain meaning" results in a conflict with the forthwith requirement of the
SAA.
99. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965); see Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 113 (1964) (a rule must regulate procedure, not substantive rights, to be within
the scope of the Enabling Act).
100. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
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Act displace prior federal statutes. 10 1 Because Congress has the inherent
power to repeal prior acts by new statutes, this statutory scheme is
constitutional.
Rule 4(j) falls within the Supreme Court's power under the Enabling
Act because it does not affect the substantive rights of any litigant."
The legislative history of Rule 4 does not indicate that the method proposed for service was thought to transgress the Enabling Act's restriction
to rules of procedure.'0 3 All this evidence, coupled with the heavy presumption of validity the Rules possess,"° demonstrates that Rule 4(j) is
within the bounds of the Enabling Act. Since Part I of this Note establishes that the forthwith requirement of the SAA is procedural, Rule 4(j)
as a valid Federal Rule properly supersedes the provision.
CONCLUSION

The forthwith provision of the SAA is not an integral part of the
waiver of immunity but rather a procedural device enacted in the absence
of a uniform requirement. The SAA's purpose is to subject the government to suits in admiralty. Interpreting the forthwith requirement as
jurisdictional sometimes defeats this policy without justification.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to actions in admiralty.
Their purpose, uniformity of federal actions in which federal law furnishes the rules of decision, should be given effect. By applying the forthwith provision, courts are not only misinterpreting the proper role of the
FRCP in the federal statutory scheme, they are undermining the congressional intent of uniform procedure. Because the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Federal Rules preempt inconsistent federal statutes,
courts should apply the 120-day restriction of Rule 4(j) in place of the
forthwith provision of the SAA.
Gregory J. Ressa
101. See supra Part II.A. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941); Burbank, supra note 74, at 1161.
102. Service provisions normally do not affect the substantive rights of litigants. See
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468-69 (1965); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946).
103. Report accompanying P.L. 97-462 (96 Stat. 2527), reprintedin 96 F.R.D. 81, 119;
see 1982 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4j) advisory committee note.
104. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). The Hanna test creates this
presumption. To effectively challenge a Federal Rule, a litigant must demonstrate that
the Supreme Court, Congress and the Advisory Committee misinterpreted either the Enabling Act or the constitutional restrictions on the Court's rulemaking authority. Id.

